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Works Councils, Wages, and Job Satisfaction 
 
We investigate the effects of works councils on employees’ wages and job satisfaction in 
general and for subgroups with respect to sex and occupational status. Making use of a 
German representative sample of employees, we find that employees, who move to a firm 
with a works council, report increases in job satisfaction, but do not receive particular wage 
increases. Especially the job satisfaction of female employees is affected by a change in 
works council status. However, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the introduction 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Works councils – representing the workforce of a firm – are supposed to function as 
firm-level complements to national or sectoral labor negotiations in several countries. 
They are supposed to foster communication between employees and management 
and to build trustful and cooperative relations within the firm. The intended purpose 
is therefore to create some kind of economic rent rather than purely counteract the 
decision of the management in order to redistribute rents in favor of employees. 
Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence show that the presence of works 
councils may affect both the allocation and the distribution of rents (Freeman and 
Lazear, 1995; Addison et al., 2001). The possible efficiency effect, for instance 
driven by a voice function in the sense of Hirschman (1970), is also beneficial for the 
employer.  
Works councils do not have the right to bargain over wages in general. They may 
only negotiate issues with the local management that are not covered by collective 
agreements with unions. However, works councils may influence wages indirectly 
even without being directly involved in the bargaining process. Works councils may 
use their codetermination rights on many other issues for rent-seeking activities and 
informal negotiations with the management. If they fail to reach an agreement in 
informal negotiations with the management, works councils can hinder or delay 
decisions on issues with codetermination rights. Works councils’ opportunities for a 
wage premium include allocating workers into higher defined occupational wage 
groups or working towards wages above the collective wage agreements. 
Works councils may also influence employees’ job satisfaction both directly and 
indirectly. They usually have codetermination rights on working time regulations as 
well as health and safety issues at the workplace. Besides they may affect changes in 
work processes, the working environment and job content. Moreover, they may use 
their bargaining power to negotiate work practices that require lower effort costs of 
the employees (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003). If they use these rights in favor of the 
employees, an increased level of job satisfaction may occur.  
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The aim of this study is to examine the impact of works councils on wages and job 
satisfaction. In contrast to some previous studies, which have mostly used 
establishment data, we focus on the employees’ perspective. We use data from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) of the years 2001 and 2006. The GSOEP is 
a rich representative data set of people living in Germany. We examine changes in 
the works council’s status on wages and job satisfaction. We argue that certain 
groups of employees may benefit more than others and therefore, we also analyse 
whether subgroups of employees with respect to sex (men vs. women) and 
occupational status (blue collar vs. white collar workers) are affected in particular. 
Moreover, the overall sample contains stayer and those employees, who move to 
another firm during the observation period. A works council is introduced in certain 
firms when considering stayer. Mover are likely to switch to firms with existing 
works councils. This is the first contribution on the topic with an explicit distinction 
between stayer and mover.   
Previous studies on the effects of works councils and wages use establishment data 
by the majority. Most focus on consequences from a firm’s perspective, e.g. on 
productivity and profits (Addison et al., 1996, 2000, 2001; Zwick, 2004) or 
investments (Askildsen et al., 2006; Addison et al., 2007). Some others examine the 
interactive role of collective agreements and works councils on the wage policy of 
firms (Heywood et al., 1998; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2002; Nergaard et al. 2009) or 
the wage level (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003). Addison et al. (2010) use German linked 
employer-employee data (LIAB) for their cross section analysis of the year 2001. 
They find a positive relation between wages and works councils in general and in 
particular for women. This result has also been found by Gartner and Stefan (2004) 
as well as Heinze and Wolf (2010). To the best of our knowledge there is just one 
study that also uses individual data over time. Based on the GSOEP and the IAB 
data, Kraft and Lang (2008) focus on the introduction of a works council and do not 
find an effect on wages. They neither distinguish between job mover and stayer nor 
control for the economic situation of the firms. 
Freeman (1978) was one of the first, who argues that job satisfaction is an 
economically relevant variable. Several contributions examined the effect of unions 
on job satisfaction since then (e.g. Borjas, 1979; Bender and Sloane, 1998; Hammer 
and Avgar, 2005; Artz, 2010). These studies focus on the U.S., where unions usually   3
act at the firm level as works councils do in other countries. However, still only little 
attention has been paid to the influence of works councils on job satisfaction. One 
exception is the study by Jirjahn and Tsertsvadze (2006). They use the GSOEP data 
of 2001 and find that job satisfaction is negatively associated with the existence of 
works councils on average. They also show some differences with regard to 
occupational status, but were not able to examine the development over time due to 
lack of longitudinal data.  
In this contribution we built on the existing literature and proceed in some respects. 
We have information on the existence of a works council in an employee’s firm for 
some points of time and are not limited to a cross section study. We focus on both 
wages and job satisfaction. We also control for the economic situation of firms and 
separate stayer from job mover. This latter important differentiation is used since 
results may be driven by employees, who change their firm during the observation 
period.  
This contribution will proceed as follows: Based on some theoretical considerations, 
we derive hypotheses for the effects of works councils on employees’ wages and job 
satisfaction in general and for certain subgroups in section II. We then describe the 
data and variables (section III) before presenting and discussing the results in section 
IV and V. Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  Theoretical considerations and hypotheses  
We have already stated above that works councils act as a body of control of 
collective agreements on the firm level. Formally they have no impact on wage 
bargaining with the management. Moreover, works councils may have an indirect 
influence on wages by making use of their codetermination rights. These rights 
include the introduction of new payment methods or new technologies designed to 
monitor employees’ performance, the regulation of working time as well as health 
and safety issues. If works councils and the management fail to reach an agreement, 
works councils can threaten to be uncooperative at issues with considerable 
codetermination rights. Two possibilities may be relevant: First, they can participate 
in wage agreements above the collectively bargained levels. Second, they can   4
negotiate about the allocation of employees in higher wage groups. Therefore, we 
formulate: 
Hypothesis 1: Wages are increased by works councils. 
 
Works councils may also affect employees’ job satisfaction. On the one hand, some 
arguments hint for a negative relation. Freeman and Rogers (1999) point out that 
employees prefer the possibility of direct participation and autonomy at the 
workplace. The existence of a works council may lead to a stronger formalization of 
intra-firm decision-making processes and thus the possibilities of employees’ direct 
participation are limited. Moreover, works councils may aim to mobilize employees 
to reach a stronger support in negotiations with the employer and a better chance to 
enforce their demands. Therefore, works councils may create dissatisfaction among 
employees by revealing certain problems.  
On the other hand, severe arguments speak for a positive interrelation of works 
councils and job satisfaction. Analogously to unions (see Freeman and Medoff, 
1984) works councils act as a collective voice institution in the sense of Hirschman 
(1970). This enables employees to express their dissatisfaction with certain working 
conditions instead of quitting their jobs. The employer is interested in such decentral 
information and thus in adjusting the working conditions with respect to employees’ 
preferences. This may lead to a lower turnover rate and higher motivation. Without a 
works council the problem occurs that contributions to improvement of working 
conditions have the character of public goods. Employees will act as free-riders 
instead of engaging in an improvement. Therefore, a works council aggregates 
employees’ preferences and communicates them to the employer. If the employer 
listens to works councils’ advices and improves working conditions accordingly, 
employees’ job satisfaction will increase. 
Additionally, a works council can increase trust between the employer and the 
workforce (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Addison et al., 2001; Frege, 2002; Jirjahn and 
Kraft, 2007; Jirjahn, 2010). Without a works council employees have only vague 
information about the economic situation of the firm. Usually, employees are willing 
to make concessions in the case of severe economic problems of the firm. Hence,   5
there is an incentive for the firm to feign a crisis. Anticipating this opportunistic 
behaviour, employees may then abstain from concessions in any case. A works 
council with information rights concerning the firm’s economic situation can then 
foster trust between the employer and employees and, thus, increase empoyees’ job 
satisfaction. 
Similar, such trust considerations may also reduce ratchet effect problems (Laffont 
and Tirole, 1988; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003; Jirjahn, 2010). Employees receive 
payments for their performance. If they fear that the employer will alter future 
payments with respect to their past performance, they will withhold efforts. A works 
council provided with codetermination rights in this issue can hinder an unjustified 
increase in target levels and again protect employees’ interests. This may lead to an 
increase in their job satisfaction. 
Finally, fairness considerations may also be relevant. Not only the result of decisions, 
but also the decision-making process is important for employees. Respect and 
appreciation by the employer influence employees’ job satisfaction positively (Frey 
et al., 2004; Jirjahn and Tsertsvadze, 2006). A works council may therefore lead to 
an increase of procedural fairness from employees’ view and a rise of their job 
satisfaction.  
We think that these positive effects of works councils outweigh the possible negative 
aspects and formulate 
Hypothesis 2: Employees’ job satisfaction is increased by works councils. 
 
If works councils indeed increase wages and job satisfaction of employees, the 
question follows directly, whether certain groups of employees benefit more than 
others. The gender pay gap is a well known empirical fact. Several possible 
explanations such as job segregation, gaps in employment history, turnover, training 
and discrimination have been examined (e.g. Light and Ureta, 1990; Phipps et al., 
2001; Bayard et al., 2003; Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2005; Flabbi, 2010). Then it is 
quite straightforward to argue that the presence of an institution as a works council 
makes direct wage discrimination for an employer much more difficult. Detecting an 
uneven pay, the works council may again threaten to cancel cooperation. Jirjahn and   6
Kraft (2007) state that works councils aim to reduce the wage dispersion, since it 
reflects the heterogeneity of the employees. However, works councilors may also 
consider the interests of male employees since employment rates of women are lower 
and male employees accumulate the majority in many firms. We will empirically 
examine particular effects by looking at subgroups of female and male employees. 
There may also be differences between blue collar and white collar employees. Some 
codetermination rights such as rights concerning working time regulations for shift 
working are relevant for blue collar workers in particular. Besides, direct 
communication with the management and participation is less possible for blue collar 
workers. An existing works council can engage for this subgroup of employees and 
represent their interests to the management, which may lead to particular effects on 
job satisfaction.  
  
III.  Data, Variables and Statistical Procedure 
Data 
Our empirical investigation is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP), which is a yearly representative panel survey of individuals living in 
Germany (see http://www.diw.de/en/soep for a detailed description of the data set). 
The GSOEP encompasses numerous topics which include demographic 
characteristics as well as characteristics of employees’ firms and jobs including 
wages and job satisfaction. Information on the existence of a works council in an 
employee’s plant is only collected in the years 2001 and 2006. We consider 
employees of private sector firms with five or more employees. We exclude civil 
servants from our analysis and restrict our sample to full- and part-time employees 
between 18 and 65 of age. About half of them work in a firm, which is covered by a 
works council. 
We want to focus on changes in works council status and distinguish between two 
groups of employees with respect to works council status in particular: The first 
group includes individuals, who neither work in a firm with a works council in 2001 
nor in 2006. The second do not report a works council in 2001, but do so in 2006. 
Due to these restrictions we get a balanced panel with 2042 observations and 1021   7
employees. There are changes in works council status due to two different 
phenomena. First, employees stay at their firm and a works council is introduced. 
Second, the employee moves to another firm during the observation period. We 
distinguish between mover and stayer in our empirical analysis. 
 
Variables 
The gross monthly wage is our first dependent variable. As already suggested by 
Mincer (1974) and applied in countless studies on wage determination before, we use 
logs of wages. The wages of the year 2001 are adjusted to prices of the year 2006 by 
the consumer price index to make the data comparable. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics. From 2001 to 2006 the average wage level increases from 2240 € to 
2350 €. Employees’ job satisfaction is our second dependent variable. Respondents 
have to answer the question “How satisfied are you with your job?”, which is coded 
on an 11-digit scale from 0 (totally unhappy) to 10 (totally happy). The average level 
of job satisfaction decreases from 7.19 in 2001 to 6.71 in 2006.  
The existence of a works council is used as a dummy variable (1=yes, 0=no). Almost 
20 percent of employees without a works council in 2001 report a works council five 
years later. Some other variables are also included in the estimations. In order to 
determine the effect of works councils on wages, we control for several individual 
and job based characteristics including age, years of schooling and dummies for 
region, marital status, sex, nationality as well as actual working hours (per week), 
tenure (in years) and dummies for job status (blue collar vs. white collar workers), 
type of working contract (part-time vs. full-time), industry and firm size. We also 
control for the economic situation of a firm in terms of employees concerns about job 
security. Next to health status the gross monthly wage is used as an additional 
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 Mean SD  Mean  SD
Gross monthly wage  2238.89 1220.02 2350.53 1358.77
Job satisfaction  7.19 1.97 6.71  1.93
Works council (dummy, 1=yes)  0 0.189 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Age (in years)  38.34 8.79 43.34  8.77
Female (dummy, 1=yes)  0.421 0.421 
German (dummy,1=yes)  0.945 0.950 
Marital status (dummy, 1=married)  0.663 0.714 
Residence in East-Germany (dummy, 1=yes) 0.308 0.297 
Years of schooling  12.04 2.30 12.07  2.29
          Health status: 
Very good  0.131 0.069 
Good 0.507 0.484 
Satisfactory 0.295 0.352 
Poor 0.061 0.087 
Bad 0.006 0.009 
 
Job Characteristics 
Actual work time per week  41.48 11.31 41.16  10.74
Blue collar worker (dummy, 1=yes)  0.410 0.398 
Fulltime (dummy, 1=yes)  0.823 0.812 
Tenure (in years)  6.84 6.84 9.97  7.69
          Industry: 
Construction 0.126 0.111 
Financal/Corporate Services  0.149 0.141 
Manufacturing 0.311 0.312 
Public/Private Services 0.097 0.114 
Retail/Tourism/Transportation 0.317 0.322 
          Firm size: 
5 to 19 employees  0.422 0.364 
20 to 199 employees  0.447 0.426 
200 to 1999 employees  0.083 0.121 
2000+ employees  0.048 0.089 
          Concerns about job security:     
Not concerned at all  0.451 0.314 
Somewhat concerned  0.417 0.487 
Very concerned  0.132 0.199 
Observations 
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Statistical Procedure 
In the empirical section of this contribution we start with some descriptive statistics 
by comparing wages (job satisfaction) between the two groups “works council in 
2006” and “no works council in both years”. We already examine subgroups of 
mover and stayer here. Furthermore, we apply a difference-in-differences approach 
in order to examine the effect of a works council’s introduction on wages and job 
satisfaction respectively. Using such an approach, we take the issue of causation into 
account since we examine changes for individuals over the years. As mentioned 
above, most previous studies just examined cross section data. Next to general 
estimations we run estimations with respect to subgroups of employees (women and 
men, blue and white collar workers). In the case of employees’ wages we use OLS 
estimations. Accounting for the ordinal nature of the variable job satisfaction we use 
an ordered probit approach.  The group of employees, who face a works council in 
2006, acts as the treatment group. Employees without a works council in both years 
serve as the control group. The simplest equation for examining the impact of a 
works council’s introduction is 
u X y          
' 2006 in    council   works * 2006   2006 in    council    works 2006     
 
where y is the outcome variable of interest (wage respectively job satisfaction).The 
time dummy variable “2006” specifies the changes in wages (job satisfaction) over 
time. The variable “works council in 2006” captures possible differences between the 
treatment and the control group before the change in the works council’s status takes 
place. The time dummy variable is interacted with the variable “works council in 
2006”. The corresponding estimated coefficient ˆ is the one of most interest. Let 
2001 , 1group contro y  denote the average of y for the control group in the first year and 
2006 , 1group contro y  the average of y for the control group in the second year. Define 
2001 , group treatment y  and  2006 , group treatment y for the treatment group in the corresponding way. 
Then ˆ can be expressed as the difference-in difference estimator (see Wooldridge, 
2002): 
) ( ) ( ˆ
2001 , 1 2006 , 1 2001 , 2006 , group contro group contro group treatment group treatment y y y y      .   10
The interaction term, therefore, indicates particular increases for the treatment group 
with respect to wages and job satisfaction. 
 
IV. Results  
Presenting the results, we will start with the relation of the existence of a works 
council and employees’ wages and then turn to job satisfaction. 
 
Works councils and wages 
 
As a first indicator, we examine the wage changes of employees between 2001 and 
2006. As mentioned above, we distinguish two subgroups here with respect to the 
existence of a works council in 2001 and 2006. Next to the group of employees 
without a works council in both years we consider the group of employees who face 
a works council only in 2006. Focusing on these two groups, our sample is restricted 
to 1021 employees for which we have information for both years. The average real 
wage increase for these individuals is 0.05 in the five year period. It turns out that the 
average wage increase is higher for employees who face a works council in 2006. A 
bivariate difference is slightly significant between both groups (t-test for the 
independent sample, p=0.097). 
About half of individuals in the group of employees with a works council in 2006 
change their job during the observation period. The corresponding fraction for the 
groups without a change in works councils status is only 0.23. Therefore, we have a 
look at employees, who have not changed their firm during the observation period, in 
order to avoid a special impact of job turnover. Hereby, we receive a reduced sample 
of 739 employees, whereas 282 individuals switch to another firm. The average real 
wage increase does not differ between stayer and mover. Although, we find 
particular high wage increases for people who move to a firm with a works council 
during the observation period, there are no pairwise significant differences between 
subgroups (neither for stayer nor for mover). One explanation for the higher wage 
increases of mover compared to stayer may be that employees move to larger firms 
so that rather firm size differentials are examined. Indeed, 0.72 of employees with a   11
works council only in 2006 move to a larger firm, whereas only 0.05 move to a 
smaller one. 
These differences in wage changes cannot be interpreted as works council effects at 
all. It is well known from previous research that firms with works councils differ 
considerably from those without works councils; e.g. the probability of a works 
council increases with firm size (Schnabel and Wagner, 2001; Addison et al., 2003).  
 
Table 2: Average wages and change in wages for subgroups from 2001 to 2006 





   N  Mean SD Mean  SD  ∆w 
   All employees  1021 2238.89 1220.98 2350.53  1358.76  0.050 
Whole 
sample  Works council in 2006  193  2303.19 1222.89 2512.41  1421.55  0.091 
   No works council in both years  828  2223.91 1219.60 2312.80  1341.79  0.040 
   All employees  739  2268.92 1237.07 2382.87  1399.12  0.050 
Stayer  Works council in 2006  98  2292.88 1077.34 2472.37  1393.13  0.078 
   No works council in both years  641  2265.26 1260.43 2369.19  1400.62  0.046 
   All employees  282  2160.21 1172.65 2265.78  1245.20  0.049 
Mover  Works council in 2006  95  2313.81 1362.58 2553.74  1456.52  0.104 
   No works council in both years  187  2082.17 1058.76 2119.49  1098.39  0.018 
 
In the following multivariate analysis, we examine whether these results also hold 
when controlling for a number of individual and job based characteristics. We 
therefore make use of the panel character of our data and provide some difference-in-
differences estimations as described above. We have argued that the existence of a 
works council may not only have an effect on wages in general, but for women and 
blue collar workers in particular. Hence, we also run estimations for several 
subgroups of employees. 
The results from model (1) of Table 3 indicate that wages of employees who face a 
works council in 2006 do not differ from those without a works council in both 
years. The interaction term is not significant, either. Therefore, a change in works 
council status does not increase wages. This result is in line with Kraft & Lang   12
(2008) who also examines the effect of a works council’s introduction on wages. 
However, the authors neither distinguish between job mover and stayer nor control 
for the economic situations of the firms.  
As hinted above, the overall sample contains both mover and stayer. The group 
“works council only in 2006” has to be interpreted differently with regard to these 
groups. A works council is introduced in certain firms when considering stayer. In 
contrast, mover are likely to switch to firms with existing works councils.  
Due to these obvious selection effects, we also have a closer look at employees who 
do not change their firm during the observation period (model 2), and respectively at 
employees who move to another firm (model 3). The coefficient of the interaction 
term is not significant for stayer. Therefore, we cannot find evidence for a wage 
effect of the introduction of works councils. Employees, who face a works council in 
2006, already received higher wages before this institution has been established. 
Considering mover only in model (3), we cannot find a wage effect for employees, 
who move into a firm with a works council, either.  
The majority of control variables is also significantly associated with wages. The 
results are as expected and include an inverted u-shaped relationship for age, for 
instance. Years of schooling, actual working hours or tenure have positive effects on 
wages. Moreover, men, white collar workers and fulltime employees earn 
significantly more. We also find the well established firm size and industry 
differentials. Furthermore, employees with concerns about job security have 
significantly lower wages. 
Finally, we run separate difference-in-differences estimations with respect to sex 
(women and men) and occupational status (blue and white collar workers) in order to 
look at the effect of a works council’s introduction on wages for these subgroups. 
The results show that the coefficients of the interaction terms are not significant, 
though (see Table A in the appendix). Differences in wages between both subgroups 
in 2001 are driven by women and blue collar workers. 
To sum up, we do not find support for our hypothesis of a positive link between the 
change in the works councils’ status and employees’ wages. Separating our analysis 
to subgroups of stayer and mover, we do not find significant effects, either.    13
Table 3: Difference-in-differences estimations on wages 
   (1) (2)  (3) 
   Whole sample  Stayer  Mover 
Works council in 2006   0.016       (0.012)   0.027*     (0.015)   0.003       (0.020) 
Year = 2006   0.001       (0.007)  -0.001       (0.008)   0.014       (0.016) 
Works council in 2006 * 2006   0.013       (0.017)   0.010       (0.022)   0.010       (0.030) 
Age   0.006**   (0.003)   0.005       (0.003)   0.009*     (0.005) 
Age-squared*100  -0.005       (0.000)  -0.004       (0.000)  -0.010       (0.000) 
Female  -0.112*** (0.008)  -0.124*** (0.009)  -0.087*** (0.018) 
German  -0.007       (0.014)  -0.017       (0.018)   0.013       (0.021) 
Marital status   0.010       (0.007)   0.002       (0.008)   0.022       (0.014) 
Residence in East-Germany  -0.137*** (0.007)  -0.143*** (0.009)  -0.117*** (0.014) 
Years of schooling   0.020***  (0.002)   0.021*** (0.002)   0.016*** (0.003) 
Actual work time per week   0.007*** (0.001)   0.007*** (0.001)   0.007*** (0.001) 
Blue collar worker  -0.093*** (0.008)  -0.089*** (0.010)  -0.100*** (0.015) 
Fulltime   0.161*** (0.013)   0.148*** (0.015)   0.186*** (0.026) 
Tenure (in years)   0.002*** (0.000)   0.002*** (0.001)   0.004**   (0.002) 
Firm size (base category: 5-19 employees):          
20 - 199 employees   0.017**   (0.007)   0.029*** (0.008)  -0.015       (0.015) 
200 - 1999 employees   0.055*** (0.012)   0.052*** (0.014)   0.056*** (0.022) 
At least 2000 employees   0.072*** (0.015)   0.085*** (0.020)   0.056**   (0.024) 
Industry (base category: Public/Private services):       
Construction   0.046*** (0.013)   0.030**   (0.015)   0.078*** (0.026) 
Financial/Corporate Services   0.022*     (0.013)   0.020       (0.015)   0.028       (0.026) 
Manufacturing   0.028**   (0.012)   0.005       (0.013)   0.082*** (0.024) 
Retail/Tourism/Transportation -0.031***  (0.011)  -0.049*** (0.013)   0.011       (0.025) 
Concerns about job security (base category: Very concerned):    
Somewhat concerned   0.020**   (0.009)   0.022**   (0.011)   0.008       (0.014) 
Not concerned at all   0.034*** (0.010)   0.034*** (0.012)   0.030*     (0.017) 
Stayer   0.029*** (0.008)       
Intercept   2.513*** (0.061)   2.572*** (0.076)   2.435*** (0.107) 
Observations 2042  1478  564 
R-squared adj.  0.66  0.67  0.64 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   14
Works councils and job satisfaction 
We now turn to results with regard to the relation of works councils and job 
satisfaction and choose a similar empirical approach. As a first step we focus on 
changes of job satisfaction – measured as the difference between its reported levels 
in 2006 and 2001 – for the two subgroups of individuals with two observations 
mentioned above (see Table 4). Job satisfaction decreases in the amount of 0.48 
points on average. It turns out that the average job satisfaction decrease in absolute 
terms is lower for employees, who face a works council in 2006 but not in 2001. The 
difference to the group without a works council in each year is significant (t-test for 
the independent sample, p=0.003). Moreover, we have a look at employees, who 
have and have not changed their firm during the observation period. Job satisfaction 
of both subgroups of stayer decreases over the years. In contrast, mover benefit from 
job change in terms of job satisfaction. Employees with a works council in 2006 
report somewhat lower decreases in job satisfaction, when staying at their firm, and 
higher increases in job satisfaction, when moving to a new firm. The differences are 
not statistically significant, though. Therefore, differences across both groups are 
supposed to be driven by mover to firms with a works council. This group of 
employees was relatively dissatisfied with respect to jobs in 2001 (6.38 compared to 
7.30 for the other 926 observations).  
 
Table 4: Average job satisfaction and change in job satisfaction for subgroups 
  from   2001 to 2006 
      2001 2006  ∆js 
   N Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean  SD 
   All employees  1021 7.19  1.97  6.71  1.93  -0.48  2.29 
Whole 
sample  Works council in 2006  193  6.97  2.12  6.93  1.79  -0.04  2.55 
   No works council in both years  828  7.23  1.93  6.66  1.96  -0.58  2.22 
   All employees  739  7.42  1.83  6.67  1.93  -0.75  2.07 
Stayer  Works council in 2006  98  7.55  1.61  6.99  1.68  -0.56  1.96 
   No works council in both years  641  7.40  1.86  6.62  1.96  -0.78  2.08 
   All employees  282  6.56  2.18  6.82  1.94  0.25  2.66 
Mover  Works council in 2006  95  6.38  2.41  6.87  1.89  0.49  2.96 
   No works council in both years  187  6.66  2.06  6.79  1.97  0.13  2.50 
   15
 
We again examine, whether these results also hold when controlling for a number of 
individual and job based characteristics in the following multivariate analyses. Table 
5 provides some more difference-in-differences estimates.  
Taking both groups of mover and stayer into account, the job satisfaction of the year 
2001 of employees who face a works council in 2006 do not differ from that of 
employees without a works council in both years. However, the interaction term is 
significantly positive indicating that the change of works council status increases job 
satisfaction (model 1). This result does not hold if we exclude mover from our 
estimation. In model 2 the subgroups do not differ significantly in job satisfaction 
and the interaction term is not significant, either. Therefore, the introduction of a 
works council does not lead to a higher job satisfaction. In both models the time 
dummy shows that job satisfaction decreases over time. Considering mover only in 
model (3), the interaction term of a works council in 2006 and the time dummy is 
significantly positive. Therefore, moving into a firm with works council has a 
positive effect on job satisfaction of employees. It can be argued that their low job 
satisfaction in the old firm is the reason for their job change.  
With respect to the other independent variables employees’ job satisfaction increases 
with a better health status and less concerns about job security. However, the 
coefficients of some other independent variables differ between stayer and mover. 
For example, results for stayer (2) include that job satisfaction increases in wages. 
Besides we find a negative effect for schooling, which may be interpreted as 
differences in aspiration levels. Indeed, the bivariate correlation between schooling 
and job satisfaction is positive. 
Finally, we examine whether certain subgroups of employees benefit from the 
introduction of a works council with respect to job satisfaction. Again we run 
separate difference-in-differences estimations for sex (women and men) and the 
occupational status (blue and white collar workers). The results show that a change 
in the works council’s status increases job satisfaction of women in particular. Job 
satisfaction of both blue collar and white collar workers is affected (see Table B in 
the appendix). If we distinguish between stayer and mover, only the interaction term 
for blue collar mover remains significant.   16
Table 5: Difference-in-differences estimations on job satisfaction 
   (1) (2)  (3) 
   Whole sample  Stayer  Mover 
Works council in 2006   -0.135       (0.090)   0.088       (0.113)  -0.217      (0.150) 
Year = 2006  -0.209*** (0.054)  -0.312*** (0.065)   0.122      (0.120) 
Works council in 2006 * 2006   0.342*** (0.117)   0.158       (0.147)   0.321*    (0.199) 
Age  -0.020       (0.020)  -0.034       (0.026)  -0.011      (0.035) 
Age-squared * 100   0.028       (0.000)   0.043       (0.000)   0.008      (0.000) 
Female  -0.053       (0.065)   0.040       (0.077)  -0.212*    (0.125) 
German  -0.015       (0.105)   0.001       (0.135)  -0.036      (0.183) 
Health status (base category: Bad):          
Not so good   0.068       (0.321)  -0.051       (0.364)   0.535       (0.722) 
Satisfactory   0.468       (0.313)   0.379       (0.353)   0.823       (0.703) 
Good   0.853*** (0.313)   0.745**   (0.353)   1.218*     (0.703) 
Very good   1.217*** (0.324)   1.149*** (0.368)   1.542**   (0.716) 
Marital status   0.164*** (0.056)   0.180*** (0.066)   0.162       (0.102) 
Residence in East-Germany   0.005       (0.058)  -0.047       (0.071)   0.149       (0.106) 
Years of schooling  -0.031**   (0.013)  -0.044*** (0.015)   0.010       (0.024) 
Actual work time per week  -0.004       (0.003)  -0.004       (0.004)   0.002       (0.006) 
Blue collar worker  -0.169*** (0.059)  -0.195*** (0.070)  -0.098       (0.110) 
Fulltime  -0.029       (0.095)  -0.008       (0.111)  -0.175       (0.192) 
Monthly gross wage * 100   0.005*     (0.000)   0.009*** (0.000)  -0.005       (0.000) 
Tenure (in years)  -0.012*** (0.004)  -0.011**   (0.004)  -0.000       (0.014) 
Firm size (base category: 5-19 employees):         
20 - 199 employees  -0.057       (0.051)  -0.110*     (0.061)  -0.017       (0.104) 
200 - 1999 employees  -0.130       (0.085)  -0.175*     (0.102)  -0.072       (0.152) 
At least 2000 employees  -0.003       (0.110)  -0.118       (0.143)  -0.011       (0.187) 
Industry (base category: Public/Private services):       
Construction   0.074       (0.102)   0.100       (0.122)   0.033       (0.200) 
Financial/Corporate Services   0.050       (0.096)   0.141       (0.113)  -0.142       (0.182) 
Manufacturing  -0.036       (0.089)   0.007       (0.103)  -0.057       (0.175) 
Retail/Tourism/Transportation  -0.035       (0.087)   0.052       (0.104)  -0.166       (0.170) 
Concerns about job security (base category: Very concerned):          
Somewhat concerned   0.452*** (0.069)   0.503*** (0.084)   0.360*** (0.118) 
Not concerned at all   0.865*** (0.077)   0.914*** (0.093)   0.817*** (0.143) 
Stayer   0.176*** (0.060)      
Observations   2042   1478   564 
McFadden R-squared   0.06   0.07    0.04 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  17
Stayer do not benefit significantly. Sample sizes are considerably reduced, though. 
Therefore, the positive effect of a works council in model 3 is driven by blue collars 
mover. 
To sum up, a change in the works council’s status is positively associated with 
employees’ job satisfaction. However, this effect is driven by mover. Moving to a 
new firm with a works council leads to higher reported level of job satisfaction. The 
introduction of a works council in the workplace does not lead to a higher job 
satisfaction, indicating the relevance of selection effects due to job change. 
 
 
V. Discussion   
Aiming to discuss the results in more detail, it is necessary to have a closer look on 
the institutional environment of the German industrial relation system concerning 
works councils.  Codetermination rights of German works councils are laid down in 
the Works Constitution Act (WCA). The WCA was introduced in 1952 and extended 
in 1972, 1989 and 2001. According to this law, works councils can be set up in all 
establishments with five or more permanent employees. They are mandatory, but 
have to be initiated by the employees so that they are not present in all appropriate 
establishments. The actual presence of works councils depends on characteristics 
such as firm size, firm age and the gender composition of the workforce (Addison et 
al., 2003). In contrast to German unions that bargain at the industry level, works 
councils act at the establishment level. However, there are close connections between 
these two institutions. In practice the vast majority of works councilors are union 
members, although the share has declined over the years (Addison et al., 2007; 
Goerke and Pannenberg, 2007).  
In our empirical analysis we will focus on the years 2001 and 2006, which are the 
only two years with information on works council’s existence in the GSOEP. In July 
2001 the most recent reform of the WCA has been enacted. It aims to stimulate 
works council formation, to strengthen the existing works councils and to improve 
the efficiency of the works council tools. Also the rights of works councils 
concerning employment protection, further training and procedures of team working 
arrangements have been extended (Addison et al. 2004).    18
Some studies argue that works councils increase wages (e.g. Hübler and Jirjahn, 
2003, Addison et al. (2010)). Our examination does not confirm this interrelation. 
Previous studies use other data sets and/or cross section analyses. Another reason for 
lacking evidence in this contribution might be that firms, which introduced a works 
council between 2001 and 2006, already paid higher wages before the introduction 
occured, so that there is less scope for a further increase. This consideration is in line 
with our result for stayer. Then, establishing a works council can be rather 
interpreted as a hint for a workforce’s motivation to protect their rents. However, it is 
not the objective of this study to distinguish between effects concerning the 
allocation and distribution of rents (see instead Jirjahn, 2009; Beckmann et al., 2010) 
and we do not examine the effect of works councils on firms’ productivity (e.g. 
Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003; Wagner et al, 2006). Another argument of lacking 
evidence of works councils’ effects on wages is that we do not know exactly the 
timing of the works councils’ introduction If the introduction has been taken place 
shortly before 2006, there may not be sufficient time for a works council to have an 
influence on employees’ wages. 
The same argument may also hold for job satisfaction. However, the effect of 
implementing a works council may only be transitory and has already been 
disappeared in 2006. If works councils cannot fulfill employees’ expectations or 
aspirations after an introduction, their job satisfaction will decrease again. This is in 
line with results from Powdthavee (2010) who examines unions’ effects on job 
satisfaction for the UK. Indeed, workers report, on average, a significant net increase 
in overall job satisfaction directly after unionization.
 But shortly after this event, 
workers’ job satisfaction returns to the former level.
  
We argued above that works councils represent the interests of blue collar workers in 
particular. We do not find support for this consideration. Some arguments can be 
given that are based on the institutional characteristics of the German case. First, the 
amended WCA also strengthens the works councils’ influence in matters of 
employees’ training (Addison et al. 2004). Bellmann and Ellguth (2006) show that 
firms with works councils have a higher training coverage of the workforce. 
Georgellis and Lange (2007) find particular relevance of training for white collar 
workers and a positive relationship of employer financed training with job 
satisfaction. Second, with the recent reform of the WCA the promotion of work-  19
family-reconciliation by a works council is explicitly fixed by law. Some studies 
point out that work-life balance provisions have become more and more important 
due to changes in family structure and employees’ priorities (Brandon and Temple, 
2006; Giardini and Kabst, 2008). If such activities are realized in firms, works 
councils mostly initiate them (Botsch et al., 2006). Also Heywood and Jirjahn (2009) 
state that family friendly working practices are more likely in firms with works 
councils. Relevance of part-time work may act as an indicator of the importance of 
work-life balance. Part-time work is much more and increasingly relevant for white 
collar workers. Our data show that the share of part-time employees among white 
collar workers increases from 0.229 in 2001 to 0.242 in 2006 and is more than twice 
as high as the constant fraction among blue collar workers. Indeed, the results show 
that not only blue collar workers but also white collars benefit from a change in the 
works council’s status.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the possible impact of a change in works council’s status 
on wages and job satisfaction for employees in Germany. Since works councils may 
affect certain groups of employees in particular, we also analyse subgroups with 
respect to sex and the occupational status. We focus on the comparison of 
employees, who do not face a works council over the whole observation period, and 
those, who do report a change in works council coverage from “no” to “yes”. For the 
first time, we distinguish between mover to firms with works councils and 
introduction of works councils in firms of employees, who stay at a firm during the 
observation period.  
We do not find a significant effect of changes in works council status on wages. 
However, difference-in-difference estimates indicate a positive effect on job 
satisfaction. This result is more pronounced for women than for men. The effect is 
rather driven by employees, who move to another firm during the observation period. 
We cannot find particular effects of an introduction of a works council for 
individuals, who stay at their firm. We do not find find particular effects for blue 
collar workers compared to white collar employees, either.   20
As mentioned above, we are not able to examine transitory effects that have already 
been disappeared or long-term effects that are not yet present due to lack of data. The 
quality of further research depends on the quality of available data. It would be very 
useful to implement the question about works councils in the regular yearly 
questionnaire of the GSOEP or other surveys among individuals. It would then be 
possible to examine the short and long-term effects of the existence and introduction 
of works councils in some more detail. As our contribution shows, further research 
with longitudinal data is also supposed to distinguish between mover and stayer, 
because of considerable differences of interpreting the results. 
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Table A: Difference-in-differences regressions on wages with respect to 
 certain  subgroups 
 
 
   (1) (2)  (3) 
 
  







Works council in 2006    0.021   (0.020)    0.042*    (0.026)  -0.004 (0.033) 
Women 
Year = 2006    0.006   (0.012)    0.001      (0.014)   0.022  (0.027) 
  Works council in 2006 * 2006    0.002   (0.028)    0.005      (0.038)   0.002  (0.046) 
  N 860  642  218 
 
Works council in 2006    0.078   (0.015)    0.010      (0.018)   0.009  (0.026) 
Men 
Year = 2006    -0.005  (0.008)    -0.005     (0.010)   0.007  (0.020) 
 
Works council in 2006 * 2006    0.022   (0.021)    0.015      (0.025)   0.023  (0.039) 
 
N 1182  836  346 
 
Works council in 2006    0.023*  (0.013)  0.044***(0.014)  -0.004 (0.025) 
Blue collar workers 
Year = 2006    -0.009  (0.010)    -0.007     (0.012)   0.001  (0.019) 
 
Works council in 2006 * 2006    0.006    (0.020)    -0.006     (0.025)   0.007  (0.036) 
 
N 825  579  246 
 
Works council in 2006    0.011   (0.019)    0.012      (0.026)   0.007  (0.031) 
White collar workers 
Year = 2006    0.007   (0.010)    0.002      (0.011)   0.021  (0.025) 
 
Works council in 2006 * 2006    0.018   (0.025)    0.023      (0.034)   0.017  (0.043) 
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Table B: Difference-in-differences regressions on job satisfaction with 
  respect to certain subgroups 
 
 












Works council in 2006    -0.398**   (0.156)   -0.060       (0.198)     -0.544** (0.273)
Women 
Year = 2006    -0.221*** (0.083)   -0.362*** (0.099)      0.226     (0.187) 
  Works council in 2006 * 2006     0.545*** (0.196)    0.273       (0.250)      0.498     (0.333) 
  N 860  642    218 
 
Works council in 2006     0.035       (0.108)    0.169       (0.142)      0.026     (0.178) 
Men 
Year = 2006    -0.202       (0.073)   -0.268*** (0.087)      0.055     (0.166) 
 
Works council in 2006 * 2006     0.227       (0.145)    0.088       (0.187)      0.239     (0.245) 
 
N 1182  836    346 
 
Works council in 2006    -0.034       (0.130)    0.049       (0.165)     -0.092     (0.226)
Blue Collar Workers 
Year = 2006    -0.226**   (0.088)   -0.301*** (0.104)      0.013     (0.185) 
 
Works council in 2006 * 2006     0.296*     (0.170)    0.153       (0.214)      0.516*   (0.303) 
 
N 825  579    246 
 
Works council in 2006    -0.213*     (0.128)    0.122       (0.165)     -0.233     (0.210)
White Collar Workers 
Year = 2006  -0.214*** (0.070)   -0.344*** (0.082)      0.252     (0.164) 
 
Works council in 2006 * 2006     0.358**   (0.162)    0.123       (0.217)      0.149     (0.264) 
 
N 1217  899    318 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
  Other independent variables included. 
 
 